Arbeitspapier

Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control

Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoretical wisdom on motivational crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3553

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Thema
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
crowding-out
intention-based reciprocity
incomplete information
hidden costs of control
Leistungsmotivation
Leistungsbeurteilung
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Crowding out
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Siemens, Ferdinand von
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Siemens, Ferdinand von
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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