Arbeitspapier

The hidden costs of control: an unsuccessful replication study

This note reports a replication study of Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) medium control treatment. In the experimental game, an agent has an endowment of 120 experimental currency units and decides how much to transfer to a principal. For every unit that the agent gives up, the principal receives two units. Before the agent decides how much to transfer voluntarily, the principal decides whether or not to control the agent by imposing a compulsory transfer of 10 units. Like the original study, we observe that control entails hidden costs. Unlike the original study, we do not observe that the hidden costs of control outweigh the benefits and we observe that most of the principals decide to control the agent.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,074

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Subject
Control
Experimental Economics
Incentives
Intrinsic Motivation
Trust
Kontrolltheorie
Leistungskontrolle
Motivation
Agency Theory
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ploner, Matteo
Ziegelmeyer, Anthony
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ploner, Matteo
  • Ziegelmeyer, Anthony
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2007

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