Arbeitspapier

Team building and hidden costs of control

This paper investigates the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups resulting from common experiences in the past. Our laboratory experiment shows that agents with previous common experiences with their principals (CE agents) perform better than agents without such experiences (NCE agents). However, as soon as actual control exceeds their expectation, CE agents decrease their performance substantially, which has no equivalent for NCE agents. This pronounced decrease in effort when control is perceived as excessive represents a novel channel through which hidden costs of control materialize. Our results have important implications for firms' strategies to motivate employees.

ISBN
978-3-86304-065-9
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 66

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Thema
Employee motivation
Principal-agent theory
Experiments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Riener, Gerhard
Wiederhold, Simon
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
(wo)
Düsseldorf
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Riener, Gerhard
  • Wiederhold, Simon
  • Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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