Arbeitspapier
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2005-21
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Ownership Rights
Double Moral Hazard
Fairness
Reciprocity
Incomplete Contracts
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Kremhelmer, Susanne
Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2005
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.727
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-727-9
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fehr, Ernst
- Kremhelmer, Susanne
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2005
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