Arbeitspapier
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that the subjects achieve the most efficient ownership allocation starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 11
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Ownership Rights
Double Moral Hazard
Fairness
Reciprocity
Incomplete Contracts
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Kremhelmer, Susanne
Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
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München
- (when)
-
2004
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13535
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13535-1
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fehr, Ernst
- Kremhelmer, Susanne
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2004
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The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
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