Arbeitspapier
Fairness and Contract Design
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. Our results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 67
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Moral Hazard
Incentives
Bonus Contract
Trust Contract
Fairness
Inequity Aversion
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Klein, Alexander
Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2005
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13483
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13483-1
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fehr, Ernst
- Klein, Alexander
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2005
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