Arbeitspapier
Fairness and Contract Design
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But trust contracts that pay a generous wage upfront are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. Our results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 67
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Moral Hazard
Incentives
Bonus Contract
Trust Contract
Fairness
Inequity Aversion
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Klein, Alexander
Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2005
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13483
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13483-1
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fehr, Ernst
- Klein, Alexander
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2005