Arbeitspapier
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2001-2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Behavioral Economics
Fairness
Reciprocity
Altruism
Experiments
Incentives
Contracts
Competition
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (where)
-
München
- (when)
-
2001
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.14
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-14-5
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Fehr, Ernst
- Schmidt, Klaus M.
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Time of origin
- 2001
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The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories
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Fairness and Contract Design
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness