Arbeitspapier

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2005-21

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Ownership Rights
Double Moral Hazard
Fairness
Reciprocity
Incomplete Contracts

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fehr, Ernst
Kremhelmer, Susanne
Schmidt, Klaus M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(where)
München
(when)
2005

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.727
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-727-9
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Kremhelmer, Susanne
  • Schmidt, Klaus M.
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Time of origin

  • 2005

Other Objects (12)