Preferences for Truth-telling

Arbeitspapier

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6087

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Health Insurance, Public and Private ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
• Subject: private information ; honesty ; truth-telling ; lying ; meta study

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Abeler, Johannes ; Nosenzo, Daniele ; Raymond, Collin
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194797
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET