Arbeitspapier
Preferences for Truth-telling
Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 90 experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so. Our empirical evidence suggests that a preference for being seen as honest and a preference for being honest are the main motivations for truth-telling.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6087
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- Thema
-
private information
honesty
truth-telling
lying
meta study
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Abeler, Johannes
Nosenzo, Daniele
Raymond, Collin
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Abeler, Johannes
- Nosenzo, Daniele
- Raymond, Collin
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2019
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