Arbeitspapier

Preferences for Truth-Telling

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 72 experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so. None of the most popular explanations suggested in the literature can explain the data. We show that only combining a preference for being honest with a preference for being seen as honest can organize the empirical evidence.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 10188

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Thema
private information
honesty
truth-telling
lying
meta study

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Abeler, Johannes
Nosenzo, Daniele
Raymond, Collin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Abeler, Johannes
  • Nosenzo, Daniele
  • Raymond, Collin
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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