Arbeitspapier
Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention
Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1123
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: General
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Thema
-
Strategic information transmission
truth-telling
trust, sender-receiver game
Informationsverbreitung
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gurdal, Mehmet Y.
Ozdogan, Ayca
Saglam, Ismail
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
- (wo)
-
Istanbul
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gurdal, Mehmet Y.
- Ozdogan, Ayca
- Saglam, Ismail
- Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum (ERF)
Entstanden
- 2011
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