Arbeitspapier

Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments

Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 466

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Field Experiments
Subject
cheating
lying
truth-telling
compliance
commitment
no-cheating rule
no-cheating declaration
commitment request

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cagala, Tobias
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Rincke, Johannes
Schudy, Simeon
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(where)
München und Berlin
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cagala, Tobias
  • Glogowsky, Ulrich
  • Rincke, Johannes
  • Schudy, Simeon
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Time of origin

  • 2023

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