Arbeitspapier
Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments
Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 466
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Field Experiments
- Subject
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cheating
lying
truth-telling
compliance
commitment
no-cheating rule
no-cheating declaration
commitment request
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cagala, Tobias
Glogowsky, Ulrich
Rincke, Johannes
Schudy, Simeon
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (where)
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München und Berlin
- (when)
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2023
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cagala, Tobias
- Glogowsky, Ulrich
- Rincke, Johannes
- Schudy, Simeon
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Time of origin
- 2023