When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance : Choking under pressure as a screening device
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Frankfurt School Working Paper ; No. 135
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Keyword
-
Leistungslohn
Anreizsystem
Führungskraft
Hochqualifizierter Beruf
Leistungskontrolle
Leistungsmotivation
Investmentbank
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Frankfurt am Main
- (who)
-
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gGmbH
- (when)
-
2010
- Creator
- Contributor
-
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2010042055
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:53 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Bannier, Christina E.
- Feess, Eberhard
- Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
- Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gGmbH
Time of origin
- 2010
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