Arbeitspapier
Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We test these predictions using German Socio-Economic Panel data. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-080/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
Labor Contracts
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
- Subject
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reciprocity
social exchange
incentive contracts
double moral hazard
GSOEP
Anreizvertrag
Verantwortung
Moral Hazard
Deutschland
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dur, Robert
Non, Arjan
Roelfsema, Hein
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dur, Robert
- Non, Arjan
- Roelfsema, Hein
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2008
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace
Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
Leniency Bias in Long-Term Workplace Relationships
Dynamic Incentive Effects of Relative Performance Pay: A Field Experiment
Social Relations, Incentives, and Gender in the Workplace
Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study