Arbeitspapier
Gift Exchange in the Workplace
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hypothesis, we show that altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better social-exchange relationships with their employees than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer -- namely, a lot of attention -- which will induce the employee to stay at the firm and work hard. Our predictions are well in line with some recent empirical findings about gift exchange in the field.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-082/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
Labor Contracts
Personnel Economics: General
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Personnel Economics: Labor Contracting Devices
- Thema
-
manager-employee relationships
wages
extra-role behavior
sabotage
gift exchange
social exchange
conditional altruism
reciprocity
signaling game
Leistungsmotivation
Soziale Beziehungen
Führungskräfte
Angestellte
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Altruismus
Verantwortung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dur, Robert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dur, Robert
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2008
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