Arbeitspapier
Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets
Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by paying high wages, and workers reciprocate by providing high efforts. Tax LSE is theoretically predicted to hold in gift-exchange markets if workers' effort choices exclusively depend on the net wage, but breaks down if they partially depend on the gross wage paid to workers. We experimentally test tax LSE in a gift-exchange market and find that it holds surprisingly well.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-065/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Labor Contracts
- Thema
-
Tax incidence
Efficiency wages
Gift exchange
Experiments
Steuerinzidenz
Effizienzlohn
Geschenk
Test
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Riedl, Arno
Tyran, Jean-Robert
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Riedl, Arno
- Tyran, Jean-Robert
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2003