Arbeitspapier

Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets

Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. In gift-exchange labor markets, firms provide a gift to workers by paying high wages, and workers reciprocate by providing high efforts. Tax LSE is theoretically predicted to hold in gift-exchange markets if workers' effort choices exclusively depend on the net wage, but breaks down if they partially depend on the gross wage paid to workers. We experimentally test tax LSE in a gift-exchange market and find that it holds surprisingly well.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-065/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Labor Contracts
Thema
Tax incidence
Efficiency wages
Gift exchange
Experiments
Steuerinzidenz
Effizienzlohn
Geschenk
Test
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Riedl, Arno
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Riedl, Arno
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2003

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