Arbeitspapier
A Firm Bargaining with Many Workers
The purpose of this paper is to analyze bargaining between a firm and a finite set of workers. In particular employment choice and the payoffs in equilibrium are studied. In the model, the firm first selects the workers it wants to hire. The selected workers then decide whether they want to proceed in bargaining with the firm. Finally, bargaining takes place. In contrast to Stole & Zweibel (1996), we assume that contracts are binding. The payoff for a worker is given by a share of the contribution to production, treating all other workers as employed, in addition to the worker's outside option.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1998:1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Firm Behavior: Theory
Labor Demand
- Subject
-
bargaining
labor demand
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Westermark, Andreas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Uppsala University, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Uppsala
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-2401
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Westermark, Andreas
- Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1998
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