Arbeitspapier
On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2018/5
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Bargaining set
core
matching market
assignment game
cooperative game
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Atay, Ata
Solymosi, Tamás
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Budapest
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Atay, Ata
- Solymosi, Tamás
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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