Strategic behavior and learning in repeated voluntary-contribution experiments

Abstract: Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions: stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game. Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct-response method, which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter

Angaben zum Objekt

• Standort: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Umfang: Online-Ressource
• Sprache: Englisch
• Anmerkungen: Postprint ; begutachtet (peer reviewed) ; In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 67 (2008) 3-4 ; 782-793

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Spiel

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2008
• Urheber: Muller, Laurent ; Sefton, Martin ; Steinberg, Richard ; Vesterlund, Lise

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.001
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-263127
• Rechteinformation: Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 25.03.2025, 13:43 MEZ