Arbeitspapier

Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments

We compare two devices previously found to increase contributions to public goods in laboratory experiments: communication, and punishment (allowing subjects to engage in costly reductions of one another’s earnings after learning of their contribution decisions). We find that communication increases contributions more than punishment, and, taking into account the cost of punishment, only communication significantly increases subjects’ earnings and thus efficiency. We study three forms of communication to understand what elements of communication are essential to this result: exchanges of nume rical messages, exchanges of verbal messages through a computer chat room, and face-to-face communication. Compared with a baseline of no communication and no punishment, we find that chat room communication increases cooperation and efficiency nearly as much as face-to-face communication, even though the chat room environment does not communicate cues of facial expression, tone of voice, and body language. Verbal communication is so effective that adding a punishment option to it does not significantly change the level of contributions or earnings. In contrast, communication limited to sending numerical messages has no net effect on contributions or efficiency.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002-29

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Public Goods
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Thema
Public goods
collective action
communication
punishment
cheap talk
Öffentliches Gut
Kommunikation
Test
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bochet, Olivier
Page, Talbot
Putterman, Louis
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Brown University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Providence, RI
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bochet, Olivier
  • Page, Talbot
  • Putterman, Louis
  • Brown University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

Ähnliche Objekte (12)