Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Strategic behavior and learning in repeated voluntary-contribution experiments
Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions: stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game. Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct-response method, which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter.
- Umfang
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Seite(n): 782-793
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Erschienen in
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(3-4)
- Thema
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Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie
Psychologie
Allgemeine Psychologie
Erhebungstechniken und Analysetechniken der Sozialwissenschaften
Experiment
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Muller, Laurent
Sefton, Martin
Steinberg, Richard
Vesterlund, Lise
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wann)
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2008
- DOI
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-263127
- Rechteinformation
-
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
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Objekttyp
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Beteiligte
- Muller, Laurent
- Sefton, Martin
- Steinberg, Richard
- Vesterlund, Lise
Entstanden
- 2008
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