Arbeitspapier

Conditional vs. Voluntary Contribution Mechanism – An Experimental Study

The Conditional Contribution Mechanism for public good provision gives all agents the possibility to condition their contribution on the total level of contribution provided by all agents. In this experimental study the mechanism's performance is compared to the performance of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. In an environment with binary contribution and linear valuations subjects play the mechanisms in a repeated setting. The mechanisms are compared in one case of complete information and homogeneous valuations and in a second case with heterogeneous valuations and incomplete information. In both cases a significantly higher contribution rate can be observed when the Conditional Contribution Mechanism is used.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 587

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Experimental Economics
Public Goods
Mechanism Design
Better Response Dynamics

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Reischmann, Andreas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.11588/heidok.00018484
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-184846
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Reischmann, Andreas
  • University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2015

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