Arbeitspapier
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners conditioncontribute from the first period on significantly more to the public good thansubjects in the strangers condition. In thestrangers condition, contributions show a continual decay, while in the partnerscondition, contributions fluctuate on ahigh level until they decrease in the final periods. We interpret subjects'behavior in terms of conditional cooperationwhich is characterized by both future-oriented and reactive behavior.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-011/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Public Goods
- Subject
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Experimental Economics
Public Goods
Voluntary Contributions
Cooperation
Öffentliche Güter
Test
Fundraising
Theorie
Wiederholte Spiele
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Keser, Claudia
van Winden, Frans A.A.M.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Keser, Claudia
- van Winden, Frans A.A.M.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2000
Other Objects (12)
Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods
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Selfish-biased conditional cooperation : On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation
Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
What drives conditional cooperation in public good games?
Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogenous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
Partners contribute more to Public Goods than Strangers: Conditional Cooperation
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
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Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation : On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation
Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
What drives conditional cooperation in public good games?
Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogenous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
Partners contribute more to Public Goods than Strangers: Conditional Cooperation
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
Taxation and Conditional Cooperation
Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation : On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: On the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation
Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism
What drives conditional cooperation in public good games?
Mandatory minimum contributions, heterogenous endowments and voluntary public-good provision
Partners contribute more to Public Goods than Strangers: Conditional Cooperation
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur