Arbeitspapier
Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods
In this paper we experimentally investigate whether partial coercion can in combination with conditional cooperation increase contributions to a public good. We are especially interested in the behavior of the non-coerced populations. The main finding is that in our setting conditional cooperation is not a strong enough force to increase contribution levels. Although, non-coerced subjects rationally adjust their beliefs about contribution behavior of coerced subjects they do not increase their own contributions to the public good accordingly. This points to the limits of the actual strength of conditional cooperation and puts some doubt on the idea that it is crucial in overcoming social dilemma problems.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3556
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Public Goods
- Thema
-
coercion
public goods
commitment
laboratory experiment
Öffentliches Gut
Allokation
Kooperation
Rationales Verhalten
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cettolin, Elena
Riedl, Arno
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cettolin, Elena
- Riedl, Arno
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2011
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