Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access

Arbeitspapier

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2012-15

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Trade and Labor Market Interactions
• Subject: lobbying ; free-rider problem ; size-distribution-of-firms ; world-price ; labor-market-flexibility ; Interessenpolitik ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Interessenvertretung ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Betriebsgrößenstruktur ; Außenhandelspreis ; Arbeitsmarktflexibilität ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mayer, Wolfgang ; Mujumdar, Sudesh
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55854
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET