Arbeitspapier
Endogenous Lobbying
In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An extremist candidate is elected and implements a centrist policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 291
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Lobbying
citizen-candidate
representative democracy
electoral competition
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Felli, Leonardo
Merlo, Antonio M.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Felli, Leonardo
- Merlo, Antonio M.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2000
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