Lobbying against environmental regulation vs. lobbying for loopholes

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 0301

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Economics of Regulation
• Thema: Environmental Regulation ; Pollution Standards ; Interest Groups ; Lobbying ; Policy Making ; Umweltpolitik ; Interessenpolitik ; Interessenvertretung ; Theorie ; Politische Willensbildung

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Polk, Andreas ; Schmutzler, Armin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76214
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ