Arbeitspapier
Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1433
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
vote buying
lobbying
legislatures
political economy
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Politische Partei
Spieltheorie
Wahl
Wahlverhalten
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dekel, Eddie
- Jackson, Matthew O.
- Wolinsky, Asher
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 2006