Arbeitspapier

Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1433

Classification
Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Noncooperative Games
Subject
vote buying
lobbying
legislatures
political economy
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Politische Partei
Spieltheorie
Wahl
Wahlverhalten
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dekel, Eddie
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
  • Wolinsky, Asher
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 2006

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