Arbeitspapier
Vote buying I: legislatures and lobbying
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1434
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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vote buying
political economy
campaign promises
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Politische Partei
Spieltheorie
Wahl
Wahlverhalten
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dekel, Eddie
- Jackson, Matthew O.
- Wolinsky, Asher
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 2006