Arbeitspapier

Vote buying I: legislatures and lobbying

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1434

Classification
Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Noncooperative Games
Subject
vote buying
political economy
campaign promises
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Politische Partei
Spieltheorie
Wahl
Wahlverhalten
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(where)
Evanston, IL
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dekel, Eddie
  • Jackson, Matthew O.
  • Wolinsky, Asher
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Time of origin

  • 2006

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