Arbeitspapier
Vote buying I: legislatures and lobbying
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.
- Language
 - 
                Englisch
 
- Bibliographic citation
 - 
                Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1434
 
- Classification
 - 
                Wirtschaft
Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
Noncooperative Games
 
- Subject
 - 
                vote buying
political economy
campaign promises
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Politische Partei
Spieltheorie
Wahl
Wahlverhalten
Theorie
 
- Event
 - 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (who)
 - 
                Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
 
- Event
 - 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (who)
 - 
                Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
 
- (where)
 - 
                Evanston, IL
 
- (when)
 - 
                2006
 
- Handle
 
- Last update
 - 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
 
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
 
Associated
- Dekel, Eddie
 - Jackson, Matthew O.
 - Wolinsky, Asher
 - Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
 
Time of origin
- 2006