Arbeitspapier

Access charges, vertical separation, and lobbying

We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a freeentry market, we find that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such a market. The vertically integrated firm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 810

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subject
network industry
access charge
manipulation of accounting
regulation
Netzregulierung
Vertikale Integration
Regulierung
Unvollkommener Markt
Regulierungstheorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Matsumura, Toshihiro
Matsushima, Noriaki
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Matsumura, Toshihiro
  • Matsushima, Noriaki
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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