Access charges, vertical separation, and lobbying

Arbeitspapier

We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a freeentry market, we find that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such a market. The vertically integrated firm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 810

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Regulation ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: network industry ; access charge ; manipulation of accounting ; regulation ; Netzregulierung ; Vertikale Integration ; Regulierung ; Unvollkommener Markt ; Regulierungstheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Matsumura, Toshihiro ; Matsushima, Noriaki
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92679
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ