Access charges, vertical separation, and lobbying

Arbeitspapier

We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a freeentry market, we find that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such a market. The vertically integrated firm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 810

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economics of Regulation ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: network industry ; access charge ; manipulation of accounting ; regulation ; Netzregulierung ; Vertikale Integration ; Regulierung ; Unvollkommener Markt ; Regulierungstheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Matsumura, Toshihiro ; Matsushima, Noriaki
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2011

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92679
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET