Foreclosing competition through access charges and price discrimination

Arbeitspapier

This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tariffs and may charge different prices for on-net and off-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent to foreclose the market in a profitable way. If the incumbent benefits from customer inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead the entrant benefits from customer activism, then foreclosure is profitable only when switching costs are large enough.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 99.2009

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Economics of Regulation ; Telecommunications
• Thema: Access Pricing ; Entry Deterrence ; Interconnection ; Network Competition ; Two-way Access

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): López, Ángel L. ; Rey, Patrick
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53223
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ