Arbeitspapier

Access price regulation and price discrimination in intermediate goods markets

We consider a model of a monopolistic network operator who sequentially offers two-parted access charges to symmetric downstream firms. We are particularly interested in analyzing an alternative to current regulatory practice of prescribing access. In particular, we look at the possibility of restraining the input monopolist's market power by endowing downstream firms with a regulatory option: In case they disagree with the contracts proposed to them, downstream firms can claim a regulated access price. It turns out that this form of regulation may prevent foreclosure even though allowing for price discrimination in the intermediary market. It proves itself more beneficial to welfare than the current practice of prescribing access prices above marginal cost. Interestingly, even though one expects discrimination against the first mover, non-discriminatory input prices below cost can occur when the monopolist faces the alternative of a rather strictly cost-oriented regulated access price. Non-discrimination rules will either not become effective or result in less optimal price levels.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 731

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Subject
price discrimination
vertical contracting
exclusion
regulatory outside option
Netzzugang
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Preisdifferenzierung
Vertragstheorie
Staatliche Preispolitik
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Salim, Claudia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Salim, Claudia
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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