Hochschulschrift
Second-price proxy auctions in bidder-seller networks : a game theoretic and experimental analysis
- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Karlsruhe, Univ., Diss., 2009
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Schlagwort
-
Auktionstheorie
Internetauktion
Internet
Netzwerk
Unternehmen
Spieltheorie
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Karlsruhe
- (wer)
-
KIT-Bibliothek
- (wann)
-
2009
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
Berninghaus, S.
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:swb:90-136454
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Hochschulschrift
Beteiligte
- Ott, Marion
- Berninghaus, S.
- KIT-Bibliothek
Entstanden
- 2009
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