- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics ; 122
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Bielefeld
- (who)
-
Center for Mathematical Economics
- (when)
-
1983
- Creator
-
Selten, Reinhard
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29106215
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:50 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Selten, Reinhard
- Center for Mathematical Economics
Time of origin
- 1983
Other Objects (12)
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Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
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Some Relationships Between Evolutionary Stability Criteria in Games
Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information
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Package ‘EvolutionaryGames’
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Deductive reasoning in extensive games
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Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 1 to 9
Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games : corr. and further development
Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
Evolutionary Stability in Games with Equivalent Strategies
Some Relationships Between Evolutionary Stability Criteria in Games
Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information
The stability concept of evolutionary game theorey : a dynamic approach
Package ‘EvolutionaryGames’
Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games
Deductive reasoning in extensive games
Equity, efficiency and evolutionary stability in bargaining games with joint production
Evolutionary stability in extensive 2-person games. Sections 1 to 9
Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games : corr. and further development
Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
Evolutionary Stability in Games with Equivalent Strategies
Some Relationships Between Evolutionary Stability Criteria in Games
Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information
The stability concept of evolutionary game theorey : a dynamic approach
Package ‘EvolutionaryGames’
Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games
Deductive reasoning in extensive games