- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics ; 121
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wer)
-
Center for Mathematical Economics
- (wann)
-
1983
- Urheber
-
Selten, Reinhard
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29097890
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 15.08.2025, 07:31 MESZ
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Beteiligte
- Selten, Reinhard
- Center for Mathematical Economics
Entstanden
- 1983
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