Arbeitspapier
Response time under monetary incentives: the ultimatum game
This paper studies the response times of experimental subjects playing the Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incentives. We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with response time, whereas responders behavior is positively and significantly correlated. Hence, consistent with Rubisntein (forthcoming) we find that response times may capture relevant cognitive processes. However, the use of monetary incentives causes a reversal of his findings. These results have implications for the information about cognitive mechanisms that can be obtained from response times.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,070
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
-
Monetary incentives
Ultimatum game
response time
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Zeit
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Brañas-Garza, Pablo
León-Mejía, Ana
Miller, Luis M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Brañas-Garza, Pablo
- León-Mejía, Ana
- Miller, Luis M.
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2007