Arbeitspapier

Response time under monetary incentives: the ultimatum game

This paper studies the response times of experimental subjects playing the Ultimatum game in a laboratory setting using monetary incentives. We find that proposals are not significantly correlated with response time, whereas responders’ behavior is positively and significantly correlated. Hence, consistent with Rubisntein (forthcoming) we find that response times may capture relevant cognitive processes. However, the use of monetary incentives causes a reversal of his findings. These results have implications for the information about cognitive mechanisms that can be obtained from response times.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,070

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
Monetary incentives
Ultimatum game
response time
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Zeit
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Brañas-Garza, Pablo
León-Mejía, Ana
Miller, Luis M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo
  • León-Mejía, Ana
  • Miller, Luis M.
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2007

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