Arbeitspapier
Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game
I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Papers ; No. 06-12
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Noncooperative Games
Relation of Economics to Social Values
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Rotemberg, Julio J.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
- (where)
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Boston, MA
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Rotemberg, Julio J.
- Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Time of origin
- 2006