Arbeitspapier

Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game

I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Papers ; No. 06-12

Classification
Wirtschaft
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Noncooperative Games
Relation of Economics to Social Values

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Rotemberg, Julio J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
(where)
Boston, MA
(when)
2006

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Rotemberg, Julio J.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Time of origin

  • 2006

Other Objects (12)