Artikel

Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-20 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Subject
ultimatum game
anticipated communication
experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Capizzani, Mario
Mittone, Luigi
Musau, Andrew
Vaccaro, Antonino
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3390/g8030029
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Capizzani, Mario
  • Mittone, Luigi
  • Musau, Andrew
  • Vaccaro, Antonino
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2017

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