Artikel

Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game

Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-20 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
ultimatum game
anticipated communication
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Capizzani, Mario
Mittone, Luigi
Musau, Andrew
Vaccaro, Antonino
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3390/g8030029
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Capizzani, Mario
  • Mittone, Luigi
  • Musau, Andrew
  • Vaccaro, Antonino
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2017

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