Artikel
Anticipated communication in the ultimatum game
Anticipated verbal feedback in a dictator game has been shown to induce altruistic behavior. However, in the ultimatum game which, apart from generosity, entails a strategic component since a proposer may (rightly) fear that the responder will reject a low offer, it remains an open question whether anticipated verbal communication can be effective in increasing offers. We implement a between-subjects experimental design in the ultimatum game with strategy method manipulating the form of anticipated verbal communication (no communication, one-sided communication from proposers and two-sided communication) and find that offers are significantly higher in the presence of anticipated two-sided communication. However, anticipated one-sided communication from proposers has no effect on offers, suggesting, as found in previous studies, that it is the anticipation of feedback that is relevant.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-20 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
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ultimatum game
anticipated communication
experiment
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Capizzani, Mario
Mittone, Luigi
Musau, Andrew
Vaccaro, Antonino
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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MDPI
- (wo)
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Basel
- (wann)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g8030029
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Capizzani, Mario
- Mittone, Luigi
- Musau, Andrew
- Vaccaro, Antonino
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2017