Artikel

Evolutionary game theory: A renaissance

Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-67 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Subject
evolution
game theory
dynamics
agency
assortativity
culture
distributed systems

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Newton, Jonathan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2018

DOI
doi:10.3390/g9020031
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Newton, Jonathan
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2018

Other Objects (12)