Artikel
Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees' collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-25 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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inspection game
corruption game
evolutionary game
non-cooperative game
dynamic game
multiple inspectees
multiple violation levels
inspection budget
punishment fine
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Katsikas, Stamatios
Kolokoltsov, Vassili
Yang, Wei
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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MDPI
- (wo)
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Basel
- (wann)
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2016
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g7040031
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Katsikas, Stamatios
- Kolokoltsov, Vassili
- Yang, Wei
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2016