Artikel

Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees' collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-25 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
inspection game
corruption game
evolutionary game
non-cooperative game
dynamic game
multiple inspectees
multiple violation levels
inspection budget
punishment fine

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Katsikas, Stamatios
Kolokoltsov, Vassili
Yang, Wei
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.3390/g7040031
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Katsikas, Stamatios
  • Kolokoltsov, Vassili
  • Yang, Wei
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2016

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