Arbeitspapier

An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies

We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer´s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-018

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Thema
experiments
incomplete information
social preferences
ultimatum

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Nardi, Chiara
Soraperra, Ivan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Güth, Werner
  • Levati, M. Vittoria
  • Nardi, Chiara
  • Soraperra, Ivan
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2014

Ähnliche Objekte (12)