Arbeitspapier
An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer´s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-018
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
experiments
incomplete information
social preferences
ultimatum
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Nardi, Chiara
Soraperra, Ivan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Nardi, Chiara
- Soraperra, Ivan
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2014