An ultimatum game with multidimensional response strategies

Arbeitspapier

We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative and strin- gent approach to type classification, we find that the overwhelming majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer´s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer, thereby suggesting a strong concern for integrity.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-018

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: experiments ; incomplete information ; social preferences ; ultimatum

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Güth, Werner ; Levati, M. Vittoria ; Nardi, Chiara ; Soraperra, Ivan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104573
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET