A Reform Dilemma in Polarized Democracies

Arbeitspapier

We study the feasibility and efficiency of policy reforms in polarized democracies. We develop a simple election model where (i) reforms are costly for voters and politicians and these costs increase with the extent of policy change, and (ii) politicians differ in their ability to carry out reforms efficiently. We identify a so-called Reform Dilemma, which manifests itself in two variants. From a static perspective, low-reform-ability politicians may be elected, who impose high costs on citizens for each reform step. From a dynamic perspective, incumbents may choose socially undesirable policies to align the social need for reform with their own reform ability and are thus re-elected regardless of their reform ability. In general, both manifestations of the Reform Dilemma are more pronounced when political parties' positions are polarized. Furthermore, the existence of the Reform Dilemma is independent of the exact point in time when the abilities of candidates reveal themselves and become common knowledge.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 16/255

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Elections ; democracy ; costs of reform ; political polarization ; Politische Reform ; Demokratie ; Soziale Kosten ; Ideologie ; Politische Einstellung ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Entscheidungstheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gersbach, Hans ; Tejada, Oriol
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010688177
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171698
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ