Tacit collusion in repeated auctions

Abstract: "The authors study tacit collusion in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. They adopt a stringent interpretation of tacit collusion as collusion without communication about strategies that we model as a symmetry restriction on repeated game strategies: Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning an auction. The authors obtain three classes of results: 1. Completely refraining from using names, i.e. strengthening the symmetry constraint, rules out collusion altogether, and even if naming is permitted, as per our definition of tacit collusion, the lack of communication limits collusive strategies and payoffs among impatient bidders. 2. If communication is allowed, there are sustained improvements over bid rotation and competitive bidding among patient bidders. 3. These gains extend to tacit collusion among patient bidders. However, whether tacit or not, collusion need not

Alternative title
Stillschweigende Kollusion in wiederholten Auktionen
Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource, 52 S.
Language
Deutsch
Notes
Veröffentlichungsversion

Bibliographic citation
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 01-23

Keyword
Auktionstheorie
Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
Theorie
Unendliches Spiel

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2001
Creator
Contributor
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-115426
Rights
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
15.08.2025, 7:32 AM CEST

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Associated

Time of origin

  • 2001

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