Arbeitspapier
Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values. Specifically, it identifies conditions under which an equilibrium collusion scheme is fully efficient in the sense that the bidders' payoff is close to what they get when the object is allocated to the highest valuation bidder at the reserve price in every period.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 566
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
collusion
auction
communication
folk theorem
Auktionstheorie
Kommunikation
Theorie
Wiederholte Spiele
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aoyagi, Masaki
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Aoyagi, Masaki
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2002
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions
Collusion in Auctions
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Building political collusion: evidence from procurement auctions
Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect
Collusion in multiobject auctions: An experimental evidence
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions
Collusion in Auctions
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Building political collusion: evidence from procurement auctions
Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect
Collusion in multiobject auctions: An experimental evidence
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit collusion in repeated auctions
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions
Collusion in Auctions
Auctions as Collusion Devices
Tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication
Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Building political collusion: evidence from procurement auctions
Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect