Arbeitspapier
Fostering Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good A Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment at Wikipedia
This natural field experiment tests the effects of purely symbolic awards on volunteer retention in a public goods context. The experiment is conducted at Wikipedia, which faces declining editor retention rates. Randomization assures that receipt of the award is orthogonal to previous performance. The analysis reveals that awards have a sizeable and statistically significant effect on retention. The findings are noteworthy firstly for showing that symbolic awards with no career-related implications can positively impact behavior. Secondly, they indicate that the awards' motivating effect goes beyond serving reputational concerns and even positively affects recipients' private identity.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2015-05
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Field Experiments
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Public Goods
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gallus, Jana
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
- (wo)
-
Zürich
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gallus, Jana
- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Entstanden
- 2015
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions
Voluntary contributions 'vote out' public ones
Matching subsidies and voluntary contributions: A review
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'
Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1846
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1857
Consistent or balanced? : On the dynamics of voluntary contributions
Consistent or balanced? On the dynamics of voluntary contributions
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions
Voluntary contributions 'vote out' public ones
Matching subsidies and voluntary contributions: A review
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'
Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1846
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1857
Consistent or balanced? : On the dynamics of voluntary contributions
Consistent or balanced? On the dynamics of voluntary contributions
Supported by Voluntary Contributions - Karikatur
An Econometric Analysis of Voluntary Contributions
Voluntary contributions 'vote out' public ones
Matching subsidies and voluntary contributions: A review
On collective goods, voluntary contributions, and fundraising
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Predicting Voluntary Contributions by `Revealed-Preference Nash-Equilibrium'
Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1846
German Hospital Dalston : supported by voluntary contributions. 1857
Consistent or balanced? : On the dynamics of voluntary contributions