Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

Arbeitspapier

We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2012-18

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: General ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Public Goods
• Subject: voluntary contribution mechanism ; public goods experiments ; learning ; limited information ; confusion ; conditional cooperation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bayer, Ralph-C. ; Renner, Elke ; Sausgruber, Rupert
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (where): Nottingham
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/100166
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET