Consistent or balanced? On the dynamics of voluntary contributions

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the dynamic effects of a charitable lottery and an income tax on donations. The analysis is based on a two-round dictator game with the subject's charity of choice as recipient and additional incentives in the first round only. The immediate effect of a charitable lottery leads to higher contributions and we cannot find substantial crowding out of voluntary contributions in the presence of an income tax. These economic interventions weakly spill-over to the subsequent donation decisions without additional incentives. Our results suggest the presence of consistency seeking behaviour. This is especially true for a subgroup of participants with a rule-based mind-set and our research shows the importance of the subjects' moral framework in the context of dynamic pro-social behaviour.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 14-060

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
• Thema: charitable giving ; laboratory experiment ; lottery ; tax ; voluntary contribution mechanism

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gallier, Carlo ; Reif, Christiane ; Römer, Daniel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102289
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-370709
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ